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Operation Torch

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Operation Torch
Part of the North African campaign of the Second World War

Landings during the operation
Date8–16 November 1942
(1 week and 1 day)
Location
French Morocco, French Algeria
Result Allied victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents

 United States
 United Kingdom

 Free France[1]
Naval only:

 Vichy France

Commanders and leaders
Strength
Ground forces:
107,000 troops
35,000 in Morocco
39,000 near Algiers
33,000 near Oran
Naval activity:
108 aircraft
350 warships
500 transports		 Ground forces:
125,000 troops
210 tanks
500 aircraft
many shore batteries
Naval forces:
1 battleship (partially armed)
10 other warships
11 submarines
Germany: 14 submarines
Italy: 14 submarines[3]
Casualties and losses
United States:
526 dead
United Kingdom:
574 dead
All Other Allies:
756 total wounded[4]
1 escort carrier
4 destroyers lost
2 sloops lost
6 troopships lost
1 minesweeper lost
1 auxiliary anti-aircraft ship lost		 Vichy France:
1,346+ dead
1,997 wounded
1 light cruiser lost
5 destroyers lost
6 submarines lost
2 flotilla leaders lost
Germany: 8 submarines lost by 17 November
Italy: 2 submarines lost by 17 November[5]

Operation Torch (8–16 November 1942) was an Allied invasion of French North Africa during the Second World War. Torch was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces the opportunity to begin their fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on a limited scale.[6] It was the first mass involvement of US troops in the European–North African Theatre and saw the first airborne assault carried out by the United States (by the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment).

The French colonies were aligned with Germany via Vichy France but the loyalties of the population were mixed. Reports indicated that they might support the Allies. The American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in Mediterranean theater of the war, approved plans for a three-pronged attack on Casablanca (Western), Oran (Centre) and Algiers (Eastern), then a rapid move on Tunis to catch Axis forces in North Africa from the west in conjunction with the British advance from Egypt.

The Western Task Force encountered unexpected resistance and bad weather but Casablanca, the principal French Atlantic naval base, was captured after a short siege. The Centre Task Force suffered some damage to its ships when trying to land in shallow water but the French ships were sunk or driven off; Oran surrendered after bombardment by British battleships.The Eastern Task Force met less opposition and were able to push inland and compel surrender on the first day.

The success of Torch caused Admiral François Darlan, commander of the Vichy French forces, who was in Algiers, to order co-operation with the Allies, in return for being installed as High Commissioner, with many other Vichy officials keeping their jobs. Darlan was assassinated by a monarchist six weeks later and the Free French gradually came to dominate the government.

Background

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Allied strategy

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When the United States entered the second world war in December 41, British and Americans met at the Arcadia Conference to discuss future strategy. The principle of Europe first was agreed upon, but British and Americans had different views on how to implement it. Americans favoured a direct approach with first a limited landing in 1942 ( Operation Sledgehammer), and then a follow-up main thrust in 1943 ( Operation Roundup ). The British pressed for a less ambitious plan. They realized the build-up of American forces (Operation Bolero) would take time, and there was not enough shipping available for large operations. Winston Churchill proposed to invade North-Africa.[7] The head of the United States Army, General George Marshall and the head of the Admiral Ernest King strongly opposed that plan, and were inclined to abandon the Germany first strategy if Churchill persisted. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to support the Russians and as any Pacific operation would be of no help to them, he agreed to the North-African operation.[7][8][9] On 14 August 1942 Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as Commander in Chief Allied expeditionary Force, and he set up his headquarters in London.[10]

The Allies planned an Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, the territories of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, nominally in the hands of the Vichy French government. With British forces advancing from Egypt, this would eventually allow the Allies to carry out a pincer operation against Axis forces in North Africa.

The Allies believed that the Vichy French Armistice Army would not fight, partly because of information supplied by the American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. The French were former members of the Allies and the American troops were instructed not to fire unless they were fired upon.[11] The Vichy French Navy were expected to be very hostile after the British Attack on Mers-el-Kébir in June 1940, and the Syria–Lebanon campaign in 1941.[12]

Allied military strategists needed to consider the political situation in North Africa, as well as external diplomatic political aspects. The Americans had recognised Pétain and the Vichy government in 1940, whereas the British did not and had recognised General Charles de Gaulle's French National Committee as a government-in-exile instead. North Africa was in support of Vichy, but that support was not universal among the population.[13] The French population was divided into three groups:[13]

  1. Gaullists – De Gaulle was the leader of the French National Committee.[a][13]
  2. French Liberation Movement – general Henri Giraud became its leader. The personal clash between de Gaulle and Giraud prevented the Free French Forces and the French Liberation Movement from unifying.[13]
  3. Vichy French – loyal to Marshal Philippe Pétain which believed collaboration with the Axis powers was the best method of ensuring the future of France. François Darlan was Pétain's designated successor.[13]

The planners assumed that if these leaders were given Allied military support they would take steps to liberate themselves, and the U.S. embarked on negotiations under American Consul General Robert Murphy in Rabat with the French Liberation Movement. Since Britain was already diplomatically and financially committed to de Gaulle, it was clear that negotiations with the French Liberation Movement would have to be conducted by the Americans, and the invasion as well. Because of divided loyalties among the groups on the ground their support was uncertain, and due to the need to maintain secrecy, detailed plans could not be shared with the French.[13]

Allied plans

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Planners identified Oran, Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there would also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps forces in Italian Libya. The British proposed to achieve this by means of an airborne operation launched from Malta, as the French garrison in Tunisia would be too weak to resist. However, Marshall persisted in opposing the North African plan and the British proposal was vetoed, claiming Tunis was much too close to the Axis airfields in Sicily and Sardinia for any hope of success. A compromise would be to land at Bône in eastern Algeria, some 300 miles (480 km) closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower, who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers, had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some 500 miles (800 km) east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some 500 miles (800 km) west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate Spain to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca (albeit with considerable difficulty) in the event of closure of the straits.[14]

The Morocco landings ruled out the early occupation of Tunisia. Marshall did convince the Allies to abandon the planned invasions of Madeira and Tangier in preparation for the landings, which he maintained would lose the element of surprise and draw large Spanish military contingents in Spanish Morocco and the Canary Islands into the war. However, Harry Hopkins convinced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to agree to the general plan.[15] Eisenhower told Patton that the past six weeks were the most trying of his life.[16] In Eisenhower's acceptance of landings in Algeria and Morocco, he pointed out that the decision removed the early capture of Tunis from the probable to only the remotely possible because of the extra time it would afford the Axis to move forces into Tunisia.[17]

Intrigues with Vichy commanders

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Further information: Operation Kingpin (World War II) and Henri Giraud
See also: French Civil and Military High Command

To gauge the feeling of the Vichy French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might support an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting several French officers, including General Charles Mast, the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied General in Algeria. Major General Mark W. Clark, one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria aboard the British submarine HMS Seraph and met with these Vichy French officers on 21 October 1942. In the early hours of 8 November, the 400 mainly Jewish French Resistance fighters of the Géo Gras Group staged a coup in the city of Algiers.[18] Starting at midnight, the force under the command of Henri d'Astier de la Vigerie and José Aboulker seized key targets, including the telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house and the headquarters of the 19th Corps. Robert Murphy took some men and then drove to the residence of General Alphonse Juin, the senior French Army officer in North Africa. While they surrounded his house (making Juin a hostage) Murphy attempted to persuade him to side with the Allies. Juin was treated to a surprise: Admiral François Darlan, the commander of all French forces, was also in Algiers on a private visit. Juin insisted on contacting Darlan and Murphy was unable to persuade either to side with the Allies. In the early morning, the local Gendarmerie arrived and released Juin and Darlan.

With help from the Resistance, the Allies also succeeded in slipping French General Henri Giraud out of Vichy France on HMS Seraph—passing itself off as an American submarine[19]—to Gibraltar, where Eisenhower had his headquarters, intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud would take no position lower than commander in chief of all the invading forces, a job already given to Eisenhower.[20] When he was refused, he decided to remain "a spectator in this affair".[21]

Allied convoys heading from the British Isles to North Africa

Allied Forces

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Further information: Operation Torch order of battle

The Allies organised three amphibious task forces to simultaneously seize the key ports and airports in Morocco and Algeria, targeting Casablanca, Oran and Algiers. Successful completion of these operations was to be followed by an eastwards advance into Tunisia.

A Western Task Force (aimed at Casablanca) was composed of American units, with Major General George S. Patton in command and Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt heading the naval operations. This Western Task Force consisted of the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions, and two battalions from the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, 35,000 troops in a convoy of over 100 ships. They were transported directly from the United States in the first of a new series of UG convoys providing logistic support for the North African campaign.[22]

The Centre Task Force, aimed at Oran, included the U.S. 2nd Battalion 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and the U.S. 1st Armored Division, a total of 18,500 troops. They sailed from the United Kingdom and were commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the naval forces being commanded by Commodore Thomas Troubridge.[23]

Torch was, for propaganda purposes, a landing by U.S. forces, supported by British warships and aircraft, under the belief that this would be more palatable to French public opinion, than an Anglo-American invasion. For the same reason, Churchill suggested that British soldiers might wear U.S. Army uniforms, and No.6 Commando did so.[24] (Fleet Air Arm aircraft did carry US "star" roundels during the operation,[25] and two British destroyers flew the Stars and Stripes.[24]) In reality, the Eastern Task Force, aimed at Algiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of a brigade from the British 78th and the U.S. 34th Infantry Divisions, along with two British commando units (No. 1 and No. 6 Commandos), together with the RAF Regiment providing 5 squadrons of infantry and 5 Light anti-aircraft flights, totalling 20,000 troops. During the landing phase, ground forces were to be commanded by U.S. Major General Charles W. Ryder, Commanding General (CG) of the 34th Division and naval forces were commanded by Royal Navy Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough.[23]

Aerial operations were split into two commands, with Royal Air Force aircraft under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh operating east of Cape Tenez in Algeria, and all United States Army Air Forces aircraft under Major General Jimmy Doolittle, who was under the direct command of Major General Patton, operating west of Cape Tenez.[26]

Vichy-French Forces

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The Vichy French had around 125,000 soldiers in the territories as well as coastal artillery, 210 operational but out-of-date tanks and about 500 aircraft, half of which were Dewoitine D.520 fighters—equal to many British and U.S. fighters.[27] These forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria.[28] The bulk of the Vichy French Navy was stationed outside North Africa : three battleships and seven cruisers at Toulon and one battleship and three cruisers at Dakar. In North Africa, at Casablanca the incomplete battleship Jean Bart was used as a coastal battery and there was one cruiser, seven destroyers and eight submarines. At Oran there was a force of four destroyers and nine submarines.[29][30]

A map showing landings during Operation Torch.
A map showing landings during Operation Torch.

Battle

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Western task force

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The Western Task Force landed before daybreak on 8 November 1942, at three points in Morocco: In the South at Safi (Operation Blackstone), in the North at Mehdiya-Port Lyautey (Operation Goalpost) and the main thrust was at the centre in Fedala, close to Casablanca, (Operation Brushwood), and. Because it was hoped that the French would not resist, there were no preliminary bombardments.

USS Lakehurst (formerly Seatrain New Jersey), after discharging medium tanks at Safi, Morocco

At Safi, the objective was to capture the port facilities intact and to land the Western Task Force's medium Sherman tanks, which would be used to reinforce the assault on Casablanca.[31] Two old destroyers, the USS Cole and USS Bernadou, were to land an assault party in the harbor, whilst troops landed on the beaches would quickly move to the town. The landings were begun without covering fire, in the hope that the French would not resist at all. However, once French coastal batteries opened fire, Allied warships returned fire. Most of the landings occurred behind schedule, but met no opposition on the beaches. Under cover from fire of the battleship USS New York and cruiser USS Philadelphia, Cole and Bernadou landed their troops and the harbor was captured intact. Safi surrendered on the afternoon of 8 November. By 10 November, the landed troops moved northwards to join the siege of Casablanca.[32]

At Port-Lyautey, the objective was to secure the port and the airfield, so that aircraft could be flown in from Gibraltar and from aircraft carriers. The landings were delayed because of navigational problems and the slow disembarkment of the troops in their landing ships. The first three waves of troops were landed unopposed on five beaches. The cruiser USS Savannah bombarded coastal batteries at Kasbah Mahdiyya. The next waves came under fire from coastal batteries and Vichy-French aircraft. A first attempt by the old destroyer USS Dallas to bring a raiding party inshore on the Sebou River to the airfield, failed on 8 November.[33] Vichy-French reinforcements coming from Rabat were bombarded by the battleship USS Texas and the cruiser Savannah. A second attempt on 10 November to take the airfield was successful and over the next two days, the escort carrier USS Chenango catapulted seventy-seven Curtiss P-40 Warhawk to the airfield.[34] With the support of aircraft from the escort carrier USS Sangamon, the Kasbah battery was taken and ships could come closer to shore to unload supplies. On 11 November The cease-fire ordered by Darlan halted all hostilities.[33]

At Fedala, a small port with a large beach 15 miles from Casablanca, weather was good but landings were delayed because troopships were not disembarking troops on schedule. The first wave reached shore unopposed at 05:00. Many landing craft were wrecked in the heavy surf or on rocks. At dawn the Vichy-French shore batteries opened fire. By 07:30 fire from the cruisers USS Augusta and USS Brooklyn with their supporting destroyers, had silenced the shore batteries. At 08:00 when Vichy-French aircraft appeared and attacked, one battery reopened fire. Two Vichy-French destroyers arrived from Casablance at 08:25 and attacked the American destroyers. By 09:05 the Vichy-French destroyers had been driven away, but all available Vichy-French ships sortied from Casablanca and at 10:00 renewed the attack on the American ships at Fedala. By 11:00 the battle was over, the two American cruisers had either sunk or driven ashore the light cruiser Primauget, two flottila leaders and four destroyers. Only one destroyer escaped back to Casablanca. Fedala surrendered at 14:30 and transport ships could move closer to shore to speed up the unloading.[35] Meanwhile the American Covering force with the battleship USS Massachusetts had appeared before Casablanca and when coastal batteries opened fire at 07:00, the American ships responded at once and damaged the Vichy-French battleship Jean Bart with five hits, putting its one operational turret out of action.[36] Of the eleven submarines in port, three were destroyed but the other eight took up attack positions. These submarines attacked Massachusetts, the aircraft carrier Ranger and the cruisers Brooklyn and Tuscaloosa, but all their torpedoes missed and six submarines were sunk.[29]

On 9 November the small port of Fedala was in use and troops advanced on Casablanca. Despite having lost 55 aircraft the previous day, attacks by Vichy-French aircraft continued all day.[35] On 10 November, the Jean Bart was repaired, but when she opened fire, she was attacked by dive-bombers from the aircraft carrier Ranger and heavily damaged by two bomb hits.[37] The Americans surrounded the port of Casablanca by 10 November but waited for the arrival of the tanks from Safi to start an all-out attack planned for 11 November at 07:15. Orders from Darlan, broadcast on 10 November, to cease resistance were ignored until 11 November 06:00, the city surrendered an hour before the final assault was due to take place.[35]

Center task force

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The Centre Task Force was split between three beaches, two west of Oran and one east. Landings at the westernmost beach were delayed because of a French convoy which appeared while the minesweepers were clearing a path. Some delay and confusion, and damage to landing ships, was caused by the unexpected shallowness of water and sandbars. On all beaches the landings met no resistance.[38] An airborne assault by the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which flew all the way from England, over Spain, to Oran, to capture the airfields at Tafraoui and La Sénia failed.[39][38] Aircraft from three British carriers attacked these airfields in the morning and destroyed seventy airplanes which were armed and ready to take off to attack. In the afternoon the Tafraoui airfields was captured by the quickly advancing troops from the beachheads, and immediately Spitfires were flown in From Gibraltar. The U.S. 1st Ranger Battalion landed east of Oran and quickly captured the shore battery at Arzew.[38]

At the same time of the landings, in the early morning of 8 November, an attempt was made to land U.S. infantry by the sloops HMS Walney and HMS Hartland at the harbour of Oran, in order to prevent destruction of the port facilities and scuttling of ships. But both sloops were sunk by Vichy-French destroyers in the harbour and the operation failed.[38] The Vichy French naval fleet consisting of one flotilla leader, three destroyers, one minesweeper, six submarines and some smaller vessels, broke from the harbor and attacked the Allied invasion fleet. Over the next two days all these ships were either sunk or driven ashore, only one submarine escaped to Toulon, after an unsuccesful attack on the cruiser HMS Jamaica.[40] French batteries and the invasion fleet exchanged fire throughout 8–9 November, with French troops defending Oran and the surrounding area stubbornly; bombardment by the British battleship HMS Rodney brought about Oran's surrender on 10 November.[38]

American soldiers land near Algiers. The soldier at the dune line is carrying a flag because it was hoped the French would be less likely to fire on Americans.

Eastern task force

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For other battles in the same place, see Battle of Algiers.

On 8 November 1942, the invasion commenced with landings on three beaches, two west of Algiers and one east. The landing forces were under the overall command of Major-General Charles W. Ryder, commanding general of the U.S. 34th Infantry Division. The 11th Brigade Group from the British 78th Infantry Division landed on the right hand beach; the US 168th Regimental Combat Team, from the 34th Infantry Division, supported by 6 Commando and most of 1 Commando, landed on the middle beach; and the US 39th Regimental Combat Team, from the US 9th Infantry Division, supported by the remaining 5 troops from 1 Commando, landed on the left hand beach. The 36th Brigade Group from the British 78th Infantry Division stood by in floating reserve.[41] Though some landings went to the wrong beaches, this was immaterial because of the lack of French opposition. Only at Cape Matifou a coastal battery opened fire, and in the forenoon some resistance was offered at the fortresses of Cape Matifou, Duperre and L'Empereur. At 06:00 the airfield at Maison Blanche was captured and at 10:00 Hawker Hurricanes and Spitfires from Gibraltar started to flow in at the airfield. A second airfield at Blida surrendered the same day to a British plane landing on the airfield. The US troops pushed quickly inland and General Juin surrendered the city to the Allies at 18:00.[42]

The only fierce fighting took place in the port of Algiers, where in Operation Terminal, the British destroyers HMS Malcolm and HMS Broke attempted to land a party of US Army Rangers directly onto the dock, to prevent the French destroying the port facilities and scuttling their ships. Heavy artillery fire hit Malcolm and forced her to abandon the operation, but Broke was able to disembark 250 Rangers which secured the power station and oil installations. At 9:15 however she too had to recall the Rangers and abandon the operation due to the heavy artillery fire. As a result of the damage received, she foundered the next day in bad weather.[40][42]

German reaction

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In the central and eastern Atlantic, U-boats had been drawn away to attack trade convoy SL 125,[43] and troop convoys between the UK and North Africa went largely unnoticed. A Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor detected on 31 October a task force of aircraft carriers and cruisers, and on 2 November a returning U-boat reported a troop ship convoy.[44]

On 4 November the Germans became aware of an impeding big operation and anticipated another convoy run to Malta or an amphibious landing in Libya or at Bougie Bay. Seven U-boats of the Atlantic force were ordered to break through the Strait of Gibraltar and go to the North African coast. Nine mediterranean U-boats were also deployed to the same region and on 7 November five of these submarines made contact with the British invasion forces but all their attacks missed their target. On 8 November most of these U-boats were operating near Bougie and missed the landings at Algiers.[45] When receiving news of the landings, Dönitz ordered twenty-five of the Atlantic U-boats to move towards the Morocco area and Gibraltar, leaving only ten U-Boats in the North Atlantic and bringing the U-boat main offensive against the convoy lanes to the UK to a virtual standstill.[46] The first wave of nine U-boats to arrive off Morocco ran into a well-prepared defense and achieved little. Only U-130 sank three large transport on the anchorage of Fedala, forcing the port to close and ships to divert to Casablanca.[47] The second wave of fourteen U-boats was sent to the area West of Gibraltar, trying to block all traffic in and out the Straits. They sank the escort carrier HMS Avenger and the destroyer tender HMS Hecla with heavy loss of life. In both theatres of operation, the Mediterranean and Atlantic, the Germans lost eight U-boats.[48]

Between 8 and 14 November German bomber and torpedo aircraft attacked ships along the North African coast. They sank the troop transport Cathay and Awatea, one landing ship, two transport ships and the sloop Ibis. The aircraft carrier Argus and the monitor Roberts were damaged by bombs.[29]

Aftermath

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Political results

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See also: François Darlan § Darlan's deal in North Africa

It quickly became clear that Giraud lacked the authority to take command of the French forces. He preferred to wait in Gibraltar for the results of the landing. However, Darlan in Algiers had such authority. Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, made an agreement with Darlan, recognising him as French "High Commissioner" in North Africa. In return, Darlan ordered all French forces in North Africa to cease resistance to the Allies and to cooperate instead. The deal was made on 10 November, and French resistance ceased almost at once. The French troops in North Africa who were not already captured submitted to and eventually joined the Allied forces.[49] Men from French North Africa would see much combat under the Allied banner as part of the French Expeditionary Corps (consisting of 112,000 troops in April 1944) in the Italian campaign, where Maghrebis (mostly Moroccans) made up over 60% of the unit's soldiers.[50]

The American press protested, immediately dubbing it the "Darlan Deal", pointing out that Roosevelt had made a brazen bargain with Hitler's puppets in France. If a main goal of Torch had originally been the liberation of North Africa, with this deal that had been jettisoned in favour of safe passage through North Africa. When Adolf Hitler learned of Darlan's deal with the Allies, he immediately ordered the occupation of Vichy France.[51]

The Eisenhower/Darlan agreement meant that the officials appointed by the Vichy regime would remain in power in North Africa. No role was provided for Free France, which was supposed to be France's government-in-exile and had taken charge in other French colonies. That deeply offended Charles de Gaulle, the head of Free France. It also offended much of the British and American public, who regarded all Vichy French as Nazi collaborators and Darlan as one of the worst. Eisenhower insisted, however, that he had no real choice if his forces were to move on against the Axis in Tunisia, rather than fight the French in Algeria and Morocco.

A flyer in French and Arabic that was distributed by Allied forces in the streets of Casablanca, calling on citizens to cooperate with the Allied forces

Though de Gaulle had no official power in Vichy North Africa, much of its population now publicly declared Free French allegiance, putting pressure on Darlan. On 24 December, Fernand Bonnier de La Chapelle, a French resistance fighter and anti-fascist monarchist, assassinated Darlan. (Bonnier de La Chapelle was arrested on the spot and executed two days later.) Giraud succeeded Darlan but, like him, replaced few of the Vichy officials.

The French North African government gradually became active in the Allied war effort. The limited French troops in Tunisia did not resist German troops arriving by air; Admiral Esteva, the commander, obeyed orders to that effect from Vichy. The Germans took the airfields there and brought in more troops. The French troops withdrew to the west and, within a few days, began to skirmish against the Germans, encouraged by small American and British detachments who had reached the area. While that was of minimal military effect, it committed the French to the Allied side. Later, all French forces were withdrawn from action and properly reequipped by the Allies.

Giraud supported that but also preferred to maintain the old Vichy administration in North Africa. Under pressure from the Allies and de Gaulle's supporters, the French régime shifted, with Vichy officials gradually replaced and its more offensive decrees rescinded. In June 1943, Giraud and de Gaulle agreed to form the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN), with members from both the North African government and from de Gaulle's French National Committee. In November 1943, de Gaulle became head of the CFLN and de jure head of government of France and was recognised by the U.S. and Britain.

In another political outcome of Torch (and at Darlan's orders), the previously-Vichyite government of French West Africa joined the Allies.

A plaque commemorating Operation Torch at the American War Memorial in Gibraltar

Military consequences

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Toulon

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Main article: Scuttling of the French fleet in Toulon

One of the terms of the Second Armistice at Compiègne agreed to by the Germans was that the "zone libre" of southern France would remain free of German occupation and governed by Vichy. The lack of determined resistance by the Vichy French to the Allied invasions of North Africa and the new policies of de Gaulle in North Africa convinced the Germans that France could not be trusted. Moreover, the Anglo-American presence in French North Africa invalidated the only real rationale for not occupying the whole of France since it was the only practical means to deny the Allies use of the French colonies. The Germans and the Italians immediately occupied southern France, and the German Army moved to seize the French fleet in the port of Toulon from 10 November. The naval strength of the Axis in the Mediterranean would have been greatly increased if the Germans had succeeded in seizing the French ships, but every important ship was scuttled at dock by the French Navy before the Germans could capture them.

Tunisia

[edit]
Main articles: Tunisia Campaign and Run for Tunis
Italian prisoners of war in Tunisia

After the German and Italian occupation of Vichy France and their failed attempt to capture the French fleet at Toulon (Operation Lila), the French Armée d'Afrique sided with the Allies, providing a third corps (XIX Corps) for Anderson. Elsewhere, French warships, such as the battleship Richelieu, rejoined the Allies.

On 9 November, Axis forces started to build up in French Tunisia, unopposed by the local French forces under General Barré. Wracked with indecision, Barré moved his troops into the hills and formed a defensive line from Teboursouk through Medjez el Bab and ordered that anyone trying to pass through the line would be shot. On 19 November, the German commander, Walter Nehring, demanded passage for his troops across the bridge at Medjez and was refused. The Germans attacked the poorly-equipped French units twice and were driven back. The French had suffered many casualties and lacking artillery and armour, Barré was forced to withdraw.[52]

After consolidating in Algeria, the Allies began the Tunisia Campaign. Elements of the First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson), came to within 40 mi (64 km) of Tunis before a counterattack at Djedeida thrust them back. In January 1943, German and Italian troops under Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, retreating westward from Libya, reached Tunisia.

Winston Churchill salutes allied troops in the Roman amphitheatre at Carthage, during a visit to troops near Tunis, June 1943.

The Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery) advancing from the east, stopped around Tripoli while the port was repaired to disembark reinforcements and build up the Allied advantage. In the west, the forces of the First Army came under attack at the end of January, were forced back from the Faïd Pass and suffered a reversal at the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid on 14–15 February. Axis forces pushed on to Sbeitla and then fought the Battle of Kasserine Pass on 19 February, where the US II Corps retreated in disarray until Allied reinforcements halted the Axis advance on 22 February. Fredendall was sacked and replaced by George Patton.

General Sir Harold Alexander arrived in Tunisia in late February to take charge of the new 18th Army Group headquarters, which had been created to command the Eighth Army and the Allied forces already fighting in Tunisia. The Axis forces attacked eastward at the Battle of Medenine on 6 March but were easily repulsed by the Eighth Army. Rommel advised Hitler to allow a full retreat to a defensible line but was denied and on 9 March, Rommel left Tunisia to be replaced by Jürgen von Arnim, who had to spread his forces over 100 mi (160 km) of northern Tunisia.

The setbacks at Kasserine forced the Allies to consolidate their forces, develop their lines of communication and administration before another offensive. The First and Eighth Armies attacked again in April. Hard fighting followed but the Allies cut off the Germans and Italians from support by naval and air forces between Tunisia and Sicily. On 6 May, as the culmination of Operation Vulcan, the British took Tunis and American forces reached Bizerte. By 13 May, the Axis forces in Tunisia had surrendered, opening the way for the Allied invasion of Sicily in July.

Later influence

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Despite Operation Torch's role in the war and logistical success, it has been largely overlooked in many popular histories of the war and in general cultural influence.[53] The Economist speculated that this was because French forces were the initial enemies of the landing, making for a difficult fit into the war's overall narrative in general histories.[53]

The operation was America's first armed deployment in the Arab world since the Barbary Wars and, according to The Economist, laid the foundations for America's postwar Middle East policy.[53]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ also known as the "Free French", later, per de Gaulle's appellation, the "Fighting French").

Citations

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  1. ^ Opération Torch – Les débarquements alliés en Afrique du Nord
  2. ^ "Polish Ocean Liner MS Batory (Launched 1936) 2" Bronze Medallion w. Case | #1826031983".
  3. ^ I sommergibili dell'Asse e l'Operazione Torch.
  4. ^ Atkinson 2002, p. 159.
  5. ^ Granito and Emo. Navi militari perdute, Italian Navy Historical Branch, pp. 61–62.
  6. ^ Willmott 1984, p. 213.
  7. ^ a b Pack 1978, pp. 17–22.
  8. ^ Mackenzie 2014, pp. 54–55.
  9. ^ Husen 1999, p. 1270.
  10. ^ Morison 1947, p. 180.
  11. ^ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 126, 141–42.
  12. ^ Pack 1978, pp. 56.
  13. ^ a b c d e f United States Military Academy. Department of Military Art and Engineering (1947). The War in North Africa Part 2 – The Allied Invasion. West Point, NY: Department of Military Art and Engineering, United States Military Academy. pp. 4–5. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023. Retrieved 12 February 2021.
  14. ^ Eisenhower 1948, pp. 88–89.
  15. ^ Roberts, Andrew (2009). Masters and Commanders: The Military Geniuses Who Led the West to Victory in World War II (1 ed.). London: Penguin Books. pp. 84–86. ISBN 978-0-141-02926-9 – via Archive Foundation.
  16. ^ Smith, Jean Edward (2012). Eisenhower in War and Peace. New York: Random House. pp. 214–15. ISBN 9780679644293.
  17. ^ Eisenhower 1948, p. 90.
  18. ^ Documentary film presenting the dominant role of Jewish resistance fighters in Algiers
  19. ^ Churchill 1951a, p. 544.
  20. ^ Groom 2006, p. 354.
  21. ^ Atkinson 2002, p. 66.
  22. ^ Hague 2000, pp. 179–80.
  23. ^ a b Rohwer 2005, p. 209.
  24. ^ a b Mangold 2012, p. 159.
  25. ^ Brown 1968, p. 93.
  26. ^ Pack 1978, p. 44.
  27. ^ Watson 2007, p. 50.
  28. ^ ""The Stamford Historical Society Presents: Operation Torch and the Invasion of North Africa"". Archived from the original on 4 September 2021. Retrieved 5 October 2015.
  29. ^ a b c Rohwer 2005, p. 210.
  30. ^ Pack 1978, pp. 57.
  31. ^ Howe 1993, pp. 97, 102.
  32. ^ Pack 1978, pp. 91–92.
  33. ^ a b Pack 1978, pp. 92–95.
  34. ^ MacCloskey 1971, p. 130.
  35. ^ a b c Pack 1978, pp. 95–98.
  36. ^ MacCloskey 1971, p. 122.
  37. ^ Morison 1947, pp. 162–163.
  38. ^ a b c d e Pack 1978, pp. 81–90.
  39. ^ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 146–47, map 19.
  40. ^ a b Rohwer 2005, pp. 209–210.
  41. ^ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 126, 140–41, map 18.
  42. ^ a b Pack 1978, pp. 63–80.
  43. ^ Edwards 1999, p. 115.
  44. ^ Blair 1998, pp. 88–89.
  45. ^ Blair 1998, pp. 89–97.
  46. ^ Blair 1998, p. 107.
  47. ^ Blair 1998, p. 110.
  48. ^ Blair 1998, pp. 111–115.
  49. ^ Eisenhower 1948, pp. 99–105, 107–10.
  50. ^ Gaujac, Paul (2003). Le Corps expéditionnaire français en Italie (in French). Histoire et collections. p. 31.
  51. ^ Satloff, Robert (9 October 2017). "Operation Torch and the Birth of American Middle East Policy, 75 Years On". Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved 12 February 2020.
  52. ^ Watson 2007, p. 60.
  53. ^ a b c R.B.S. (9 November 2017). "Remembering Operation Torch on its 75th anniversary". The Economist. Archived from the original on 24 April 2018. Retrieved 12 November 2017.

Bibliography

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Further reading

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